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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BANKRUPTCY - TITLE TO PROPERTY - PERSONAL BANKRUPT'S
INCOME TAX REFUND PASSES TO TRUSTEE AS PART OF ESTATE.
In re Kokoszka (2d Cir. 1973)
The referees in bankruptcy for the estates of the petitioners ordered
them to turn over income tax refunds for the year preceding adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy.' Each petitioner moved to vacate the turn-over order
2
arguing: (1) that the refunds were not property which passed to the
trustee under section 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act;3 and (2) that if
the refunds were property, then the Consumer Credit Protection Act
4
(CCPA) required that the trustee return 75 per cent to the bankrupt.
The motions were denied by the respective referees whose decisions were
upheld by the district court." Upon appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,6 holding that personal income
tax refunds were property which passed to the trustee under section
70(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act and that the CCPA was inapplicable.
In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W.
3352 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1973) (No. 73-5265).
1. Petitioner Kokoszka was adjudicated a bankrupt on January 5, 1972. His
refund was for the year 1971. Petitioners Sands and O'Brien were adjudicated
bankrupts on February 4, 1970, and April 30, 1970, respectively. Their refunds were
for the year 1969. In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 993 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted,
42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1973) (No. 73-5265).
2. Id. Prior to their motions to vacate, Sands and O'Brien spent their refunds
and were unable to turn over the funds; as a result their respective trustees moved
to deny their discharges in bankruptcy. The referee for Sands' estate denied his
discharge, while the referee for O'Brien's took no action prior to petitioners' appeals.
Kokoszka turned over his refund to the trustee pending disposition of his appeal,
and was given his discharge on August 24, 1972. Id. at 993.
A turn-over order is an order issued by the bankruptcy court upon motion by
the trustee whereby the bankrupt is directed to turn over property or its proceeds
to the trustee or other appropriate officer of the court. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56,
61-63 (1948).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . . . shall in turn be vested
by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt . . . to all of the following
kinds of property wherever located ....
(5) property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the
petition he could by any means have transferred or might have been levied
upon and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized,
impounded, or sequestered ....
Id.
4. The Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970), provides
in pertinent part:
[T]he maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for
any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week . ...
Id.
5. 479 F.2d at 993. The district court had consolidated the three cases. Id.
6. As to Sands, the court remanded to the district court on the issue of his
discharge, with instructions for the referee to exercise his discretion in regard to
the application for discharge. Id. at 997. See note 3 supra.
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In order to distribute assets of a bankrupt in a manner which is
equitable both to the debtor and his creditors, section 70(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act vests the trustee, at the time of the filing of the petition,
with title to the classes of property enumerated within that section.7 The
list of assets included in section 70(a) is exclusive, and any interest not
considered "property" under it remains in the bankrupt and does not
pass to the trustee.8
When dealing with the question as to what constitutes "property"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court has stated
that the policies underlying the Act must ultimately govern. 9 These
policies have been traditionally defined as "[securing] for creditors
everything of value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable
form when he files his petition,"' 0 while giving the honest debtor "a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt."" Thus, the test of
whether the interest in question is property within the meaning of section
70(a) is whether it is sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past
and not materially entangled with the bankrupt's ability to make an
unencumbered fresh start.' 2
Petitioners advanced two arguments in support of their contention
that the refund was not section 70(a) property. They initially argued
that the court should follow In re Cedor,'3 a Ninth Circuit decision which
held that personal income tax refunds were simply a return of "excess
withheld wages"' 4 and as such were similar to the vacation pay exempted
7. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § l10(a)(5) (1970), provides in
pertinent part that "[tihe trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . . . shall in turn be
vested by operation of law with title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of
the petition initiating a proceeding under this title . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
the critical date for determining the rights and powers of the trustee and the rights
of both debtor and creditors is the date of filing of the petition. Lewis v. Manufacturers
Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 607 (1961) ; In re Lustron Corp., 1.84 F.2d 789, 793 (7th
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 946 (1951). However, certain property of the
bankrupt is exempt from the operation of section 70(a). Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11
U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
Generally, state law determines exemptions under the Act although federal
law controls in a few areas. Exemptions include, inter alia, wearing apparel, household
furniture, homesteads, insurance policies, and pension monies. For a detailed list,
see 1A W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTC Y 16.13 (14th ed. 1971).
8. Ruebush v. Funk, 63 F.2d 170, 173 (4th Cir. 1933) ; In re Huffman-Salvar
Roofing Paint Co., 234 F. 798, 799 (D.C. Ala. 1916). See 4A W. COLLIER, COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 1 70.07 at 90-91 (14th ed. 1971).
9. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
10. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970), quoting Segal v. Rochelle, 382
U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
11. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970), quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
12. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).
13. 337 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mein. sub. nom. In re James, 470 F.2d
996 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 973 (1973). The Ninth Circuit stated in
a memorandum decision that the case was affirmed on the authority of the district
court opinion and Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970). 470 F.2d at 996.
14. Cedor held that the portion of the bankrupt's tax refund attributable to an
excess of withholding tax deducted by an employer who withheld the minimum
amount required by law, was not section 70(a) (5) property and as such remained
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from section 70(a) by the Supreme Court in Lines v. Frederick.1.5 In
addition, petitioners argued that most, if not all, of the refund would be
consumed by administrative expenses, leaving nothing for the creditors,
whenever the assets of the estate are merely nominal.16 Thus, creditors
would not be benefited were the refund determined to be section 70(a)
property,17 whereas the bankrupt would be aided in pursuing a "fresh
start" in life if allowed to retain title to the fund.' s
The court rejected the argument based on Cedor by distinguishing
a tax refund from the vacation pay of Lines. It noted that the Court in
Lines indicated that the function of vacation pay was to provide basic
week to week support during those particular periods where, because of
vacation or brief layoff, the employee would be without any weekly
wage. 19 Since the vacation pay would be used as a wage substitute, it was
considered essential to a bankrupt's "fresh start" in life.20 However,
although a refund, like vacation pay, may in fact be used for basic
necessities, it is not specifically earmarked to meet basic needs during a
in the bankrupt. 337 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 1972). That portion of the
refund attributable to optional withholding was held to be section 70(a) (5) property
which passed to the trustee. Id. The distinction was required to prevent one from
increasing the level of withholding and then filing for bankruptcy. For a comment
on the distinction the court made, see Lee, Title to Property - Employee Bankrupts'
Income Tax Refunds, 47 RFF. J. 239, 243 (1973).
15. 400 U.S. 18 (1970). Lines held that a bankrupt wage earner's vacation pay,
accrued but unpaid at the time of filing of his petition, was not section 70(a) (5)
property, and thus did not pass to the trustee. Id. at 20-21.
16. 479 F.2d at 995. See notes 49 & 51 infra. Bankruptcy Act § 48(c) (1),
11 U.S.C. § 76(c) (1) (1970), sets forth the schedule of compensation for trustees who
do not conduct the business of the bankrupt, and provides that the trustee is entitled, in
the court's discretion, to a percentage of the total assets of the estate. The section
further provides that if the assets are not sufficient to produce a $150 fee, the court in its
discretion may award a fee to the trustee of up to $150. Id. In practice, trustees
are usually awarded the maximum fee. In re Schautz, 390 F.2d 797, 800 (2d Cir.
1968). Thus, in the small asset estate the trustee's fee and other expenses absorb
the majority of the proceeds, leaving nothing for creditors. In re Kokoszka, 479
F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1973).
17. See note 16 supra.
18. In re Kokoszka, 479 F2d 990, 996 (2d Cir. 1973).
19. Id. at 994-95.
20. Id. One of the main purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to give the debtor
a "fresh start" in life. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). Essentially
this means converting the assets of the debtor, as of the time of filing, to cash for pay-
ment to creditors, thus allowing the bankrupt to start anew without the burden of pre-
existing debt. Id. In Lines the Court stated that turning over the vacation pay to
the trustee would deny the bankrupt a "fresh start" since the debtor would be
forced to take a vacation without income for basic support or, alternatively, to
forego a vacation. 400 U.S. at 20-21. Since this result was viewed as in conflict
with the purpose of the Act in that it impaired the debtor's right to future wages,
the Court found for the bankrupt. Id. at 20. See text accompanying notes 36-48
infra. It should be noted that there has been severe criticism of the rationale of
Lines. See Lee, Title to Property - Employee Bankrupts' Vacation Pay, 45 RE. J.
115 (1971); 49 N.C.L. REV. 738 (1971). Justice Harlan, dissenting in Lines, felt:
(1) that the case should not be disposed of summarily by the Court but should
be set for full argument, and (2) that the majority decision gave the bankrupt a
"head start" rather than a "fresh start," since a non-bankrupt employee who begins
work on the day the debtor's bankruptcy petition is filed - the first day of the
"fresh start" in life - does not have the benefit of vacation pay accrued before
bankruptcy, sums which the Lines decision allows the bankrupt to retain. 400 U.S.
at 21-22 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 19
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particular period.21 Thus, the Kokoszka court concluded that to allow
the lump sum type refund to pass to the trustee would not deny the
debtor a "fresh start" in life.2 2 Moreover, the court noted that the mere
fact that the refund had its origin in wages was not controlling since many
assets held by a bankrupt, such as savings accounts or automobiles, may
also have their origin in wages yet are treated as section 70(a) property.
23
Nor was the court persuaded that the receipt of a refund was an expected
annual event.24  As the court pointed out, many individuals rely on
dividends from stock and Christmas Clubs at year's end to provide income,
yet such property is subject to section 70(a) (5).25 The court stated that
allowing a bankrupt to retain a refund would amount to giving him a
"head start" rather than a fresh start.
26
The court also rejected the petitioner's second argument.2 " Not-
ing that in nominal or no asset estates the refund might indeed be of
little or no benefit to the creditors, the court nevertheless, refused to
give blanket exemption treatment to all tax refunds, since some re-
funds, may be fairly large or only one of many assets of an estate.
2 8
In the latter situation, the creditors would be deprived of the bene-
fit of the refund when, in fact, other assets were available to defray
administrative expenses. In order to avoid such an inequity to
creditors yet provide adequate relief for debtors, the court suggested
that the bankrupt move for an order of abandonment.2 9  By this
21. 479 F.2d at 994-95.
22. Id. at 995-96.
23. Id. at 995.
24. Id.
25. Id. See In re Brantman, 244 F. 101 (2d Cir. 1917) (trustee succeeds to
bankrupt's rights to declared and undeclared dividends from corporate stock) ; In re
Negri, 30 F.2d 717 (W.D. Pa. 1928) (title to bankrupt's bank account vests in
trustee).
26. 479 F.2d at 995.
27. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
28. 479 F.2d at 995-96.
29. Id. at 996. See note 53 and accompanying text infra. One authority has
stated :
[Trustee generally may abandon assets which are] (1) inherently worthless,
(2) so heavily encumbered that the equity of the bankrupt available for unsecured
creditors is virtually or actually worthless, (3) so expensive to collect, care for,
and dispose of that any equity would be consumed in the process, (4) of a
value so speculative that the expense of realizing such value is a poor risk,
(5) of an nature that the time involved in collection does not justify keeping
the estate open, or (6) unable to be sold after all reasonable efforts in spite
of appraised values.
COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 587 (1963). These principles are well
established by case law. In re Ira Haupt & Co., 398 F.2d 607, 612-13 (2d Cir. 1968).
See generally 4A W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.42 (14th ed. 1971).
Although the decision to abandon is within the trustee's discretion, it is subject to
judicial review. Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513, 515 (1896). The precise action
to be taken by a trustee who has decided to abandon an asset is regulated by local
procedural rules and therefore varies among districts. Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210
F.2d 908, 913-14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 819 (1954). Certain jurisdictions
do not require the trustee to motion the referee for an order before abandonment.
210 F.2d at 913; In re Yalden, 109 F. Supp. 603, 604 (D. Mass. 1953). However,
other jurisdictions require notice to creditors and a hearing, pursuant to the referee's
order of abandonment. In re Humeston, 83 F.2d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 1936) ; In re
NOVEMBER 1973]
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
means, the equities of each situation could be determined on a case
by case basis.
30
The petitioners further urged that if the refund were found by the
court to be section 70(a)(5) property, the trustee should be subject to
the CCPA's limitation on garnishment and, therefore, could succeed to
only 25 per cent of the refund.31 Since the CCPA's definition of earnings
was broad enough to include a tax refund and garnishment was defined
as the withholding of earnings to pay debts,32 the petitioners argued that
the trustee was a garnishor as to the refund and subject to the limitations
of the Act.
83
The Kokoszka court rejected this argument, reasoning that the pur-
pose of the CCPA was to protect 75 per cent of a wage earner's periodic
pay to meet basic needs and thereby keep the honest debtor out of
bankruptcy. 4 The court felt it clear from the legislative intent that
"earnings," as defined in the CCPA, was limited to periodic payments such
as wages and did not include lump sum payments3 5 which were not
designed to provide the basic necessities of life.
The determinative factor in the Kokoszka court's decision that a
tax refund is property within the meaning of section 70(a) was its
conclusion that a refund did not possess the basic characteristic of a
future wage. It is submitted that this conclusion is justified in light of
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act and existing case law.
A trustee in bankruptcy has no claim on property acquired by the bank-
rupt after the petition is filed, 36 including future wages.37 The bankrupt's
Yalden, 109 F. Supp. 603, 604 (D. Mass. 1953). See generally 53 COLUM. L. REV. 415
(1953).
The Kokoszka court stated:
[The referee should grant the motion] if it is reasonably clear that the assets,
otherwise available for creditors, will be entirely consumed by the trustee's fees
and other administration expenses, that no creditor has shown that there was a
likely opportunity for a trustee to recover additional assets, and that the absence
of a trustee will not, under the circumstances, cast a substantial additional
burden on the Bankruptcy Court.
479 F.2d at 996.
30. See text accompanying note 53 infra.
31. 479 F.2d 996. See note 4 supra.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1672 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The term "earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal
services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise,
and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.
(b) The term "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of any
individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts
required by law to be withheld.
(c) The term "garnishment" means any legal or equitable procedure through
which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment
of any debt.
Id.
33. 479 F.2d at 996. The Ninth Circuit in Cedar had adopted this very reasoning.
337 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
34. 479 F.2d at 996-97. See note 59 infra.
35. Cf. text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
36. Hudson v. Wylie, 242 F.2d 435, 444-45 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828




Jerome: Bankruptcy - Title to Property - Personal Bankrupt's Income Tax R
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
future earning power has been recognized as essential to his fresh start in
lifes3 both as a matter of private necessity for the wage earner and his
family39 as a matter of public concern. 40 This policy mandates that any
asset sufficiently analogous to the future wage remain in the bankrupt,
despite the fact that such asset may have roots in the pre-bankruptcy past."'
As noted previously, in Lines the Court found that vacation pay
can be characterized as a substitute for the weekly wage during brief
vacation periods or in the event of a layoff.4 2 The employer provides for
the accrual of such a fund so that a wage earner and his family will have
resources to draw upon to provide the basic necessities of life during
those particular periods when the weekly wage is not forthcoming.43
Conversely, when an employer deducts sums from the weekly wage for
withholding taxes, he does so under a statutory directive and not for the
purpose of providing the employee with a tax refund. 44 Moreover, since
vacation pay is accumulated specifically to perform the function of the
weekly wage during those particular periods in the future when the wage
earner and his family are without sums for basic support, the subjection
of that asset to the operation of section 70(a) would leave the employee
with a choice of taking a vacation without income, or not taking a vacation
at all.45 The Court in Lines felt that a bankrupt faced with such a de-
cision had not been given a fresh start in life.46 In contrast, a tax refund,
when returned to the bankrupt, may be used to provide support for a
wage earner. However, it lacks the quality of vacation pay in that it is
not specifically earmarked to fill the economic void created when funds
are not forthcoming for a particular period of time.4 7 In this respect a
refund is analogous to a savings account which has been traditionally
38. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
39. Id. at 245. The wage has been characterized as a "specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system." Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). This is obviously true since the wage is
used to provide basic support for the wage earner and his family. Id. at 340. The
specialized nature of the wage is reflected in various types of statutes. See, e.g.,
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970) (limiting garnishment
of wages to 25 per cent of the weekly wage) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-361 (g),
36-236 (Supp. 1973) (prohibiting wage assignment). Case law also supports this
view. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (striking down Wisconsin
statute permitting pre-judgment garnishment of wages as violative of due process).
40. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934). This obviously refers
to the fact that the individual without funds to support himself and his family can
only look to society and the government, through welfare, to provide these funds.
41. Although a literal reading of section 70(a) (5) might include an asset
with roots in the pre-bankruptcy past, the fresh start rationale requires that the
bankrupt retain the asset, if its transfer from the debtor to the trustee would deprive
him of that fresh start. Frederick v. Lines, 425 F.2d 215, 216-17 (9th Cir.), aff'd,
400 U.S. 18 (1970). See notes 7 & 11 and accompanying text supra.
42. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970).
43. Id.
44. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3402 (directing employers to withhold appro-
priate tax on wages) ; id. § 6413 (directing excess of amounts withheld from wages
over the tax due to be refunded to the employee).
45. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970).
46. Id.
47. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
NOVEMBER 1973]
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recognized as section 70(a) property.48 A tax refund, therefore, is
properly characterized as a lump sum payment which does not retain the
unique quality of wages.
Perhaps the strongest argument made by the petitioners was that
administrative expenses would consume most of the tax refund leaving
little or no proceeds for the creditor. 49 Petitioners correctly pointed out
the futility of allowing the refund to vest in the trustee since the ultimate
sum available for creditors would not be increased while the bankrupt
would be denied possession of a small sum of money which would help
ensure a "fresh start" in life.50 However, upon a close examination, peti-
tioners' argument proves fallacious in part.
Although the petitioners' blanket approach of exempting all tax
refunds would leave the position of the creditors unchanged in the great
majority of personal bankruptcies, 51 the result would be inequitable in
those cases where the refund was substantial or comprised but one of
many assets of an estate. In such a case the creditor would be put in a
worse position since the bankrupt's estate, from which payment of
administrative expenses comes, would be reduced - a result clearly not
in keeping with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.52 Thus, the court's
suggestion that in an appropriate case a bankrupt file a motion of abandon-
ment would appear to afford a more equitable remedy in accord with
policies underlying the Act. The debtor would be given an opportunity
to demonstrate that the fund out of which creditors would be paid would
not be increased, notwithstanding the inclusion of a refund after ad-
ministrative expenses were deducted, and thus establish his claim to the
refund, while the creditor could protect his interest by opposing such
a motion.
53
48. 479 F.2d at 995. See note 25 supra.
49. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESs, REFORM 20
(1971). The authors estimate that administrative expenses comprise 41 per cent of
the amounts paid out in personal bankruptcy cases. Id. at 91. They further note that
income tax refunds usually produce only small amounts which are used to pay the
trustee. Id. at 85.
50. 479 F.2d at 995-96.
51. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 49. The authors report that in
1969, 85 per cent of the bankruptcy cases unreported were of the no or nominal
asset variety. Id. at 20. Of this number 11 out of 12 were personal as opposed to
business bankruptcies. Id.
52. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
53. 479 F.2d at 996. See note 29 supra. Although not expressly provided by
the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee's power to abandon an asset is not in dispute. First
Nat'l Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 118 (1905); 4A W. COLLIER, COLLIER? ON
BANKRUPTCY 70.42, at 502 & n.4 (14th ed. 1971). Since the practice is regulated
largely by local rules it varies considerably even within states. See Calverley, Income
Tax Refunds Due Wage Earners, 39 REF. J. 8, 10 (1965). The main obstacle to
successfully petitioning for abandonment is a practical one - refunds frequently are
the only asset of the estate and are used to pay the trustees. Without assets, the
trustee receives only a nominal fee, thus, making it difficult to recruit and retain
skilled trustees. Id. As a result tax refunds are not among those assets most
frequently abandoned. Certain jurisdictions, however, have overcome these obstacles,
leaving the process a workable, feasible one. Id. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra
note 49, at 86-87.
[VOL. 19
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After establishing that a tax refund was property within the mean-
ing of section 70(a), the Kokoszka court dismissed the petitioners' alter-
native contention that the CCPA applied to tax refunds in bankruptcy
cases. Although the Cedor court adopted this argument,5 4 the Kokoszka
court concluded that the CCPA merely pertained to weekly or other
periodic wages and not to lump sum payments. 55 Although a literal
reading of the CCPA's definition of earnings might include a lump sum
payment, 56 the legislative intent clearly indicates a narrower scope.
57
The purpose of the garnishment provisions was to protect the uneducated,
unwary, or uninformed consumer who had accumulated an excessive
amount of debt from attack by creditors.5 s The drafters of the Act
noted a high causal connection between harsh garnishment laws and
personal bankruptcies, and hoped that the establishment of fair and
uniform garnishment guidelines would decrease their number.59  Since
the CCPA was designed to assist the debtor in avoiding bankruptcy, it
would be incongruous to construe it as contemplating inclusion of one
who had already filed a petition.60
The Cedor court's conclusion that the trustee takes control of a
refund by means of a "garnishment" and that a refund represents "dis-
posable earnings" is subject to criticism. The trustee in bankruptcy does
not take by garnishment but is vested by operation of law with title to
any asset which is within the enumerated classes of section 70(a).61
Subsection 70(a) (5) encompasses all property which is capable of being
transferred.6 2 Since a tax refund may be transferable, 63 it would be
54. 337 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
55. 479 F.2d at 996-97.
56. See note 32 supra.
57. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1967).
58. Id. at 9-10.
59. The House Committee on Banking and Currency, noting the increasing
rate of personal bankruptcies, stated:
The limitations on the garnishment of wages adopted by your committee,
while permitting the orderly payment of consumer debts, will relieve countless
honest debtors driven by economic desperation from plunging into bankruptcy
in order to preserve their employment and insure a continued means of support
for themselves and their families.
Id. at 21.
60. In re Kingswood, 343 F. Supp. 498 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.
1972), also held that the CCPA does not apply to a tax refund. The district court
appended to its opinion the memorandum of decision of James E. Moriarty, one of
four referees in bankruptcy who testified in support of what later became the CCPA's
garnishment provisions. Id. at 501. See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(1967). Referee Moriarty was also of the opinion that the CCPA did not apply
to the question of title to bankrupt's tax refund. 343 F. Supp. at 501-02. However,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court
opinion on the authority of Cedor. 470 F.2d 996-97 (9th Cir. 1972).
61. See note 7 and accompanying text supra; see also 4A W. COLLIER, COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 70.04, at 48-50 (14th ed. 1971).
62. See note 3 supra.
63. It was not disputed in the instant case that the refunds were transferable,
479 F.2d at 993, n.1. Whether the property could be transferred, or levied upon
and sold, or sequestered is usually a matter of state law, although federal law governs
where property is controlled by federal statute. 4A COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
70.15 at 144-45 & n.25 (14th ed. 1971).
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illogical to hold that the trustee has garnished the property when it has
vested at the time of filing.6 4 Further criticism may be directed at the
Ninth Circuit's decision that a tax refund is "disposable earnings" within
the definition of the CCPA.65 At least one court has held that when an
employer withholds wages for taxes, such funds lose their status as
wages, and that status is not regained when a refund is paid to the
taxpayer.66 Rather, the payment is classified as the realization of a
potential tax refund. 67 Thus, the CCPA is inapplicable and does not
afford protection to the bankrupt debtor.
In evaluating the decision of the Second Circuit in Kokoszka in
light of the Ninth Circuit's determination in Cedor several conclusions
may be drawn. First, Kokoszka is clearly more consistent with the defini-
tion of section 70(a) property as outlined in Lines and Segal.68 More-
over, in those situations where other assets are available, Kokoszka yields
a result clearly more equitable to the creditor. 69 Although it may be true
that in certain instances the tax refund of the no asset debtor may be
consumed by administrative expenses, the remedy of abandonment is
readily available.70 However, in order to remove the practical impedi-
ments to this remedy, courts must endorse the practice of those districts
where abandonment is in fact a workable tool.
7 '
Further, the Kokoszka court, in rejecting the Cedor approach, has
avoided the practice of justicially carving out a national exemption policy
by restricting the definition of property in section 70(a) (5) of the
Bankruptcy Act.7 2 Certainly, if such a policy is necessary it is a more
appropriate area for Congressional rather than judicial action.
Garry Paul Jerome
64. For at least one commentator's view that the argument adopted by Cedor
is in fact illogical, see Lee, Title to Property - Employee Bankrupts' Income Tax
Refunds, 47 REF. J. 239, 244-45 (1973).
65. 337 F. Supp. at 1107. See note 32 supra.
66. In re Rosner, [1949-1952 Transfer Binder] 1 56,566 BANKR. L. REP. (E.D.
Pa. 1949).
67. Id.
68. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
70. See note 29 supra.
71. See note 53 supra.
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